An article from the June 2018 Victorian Planning and Environmental Law Association’s quarterly journal, VPELA Revue, entitled “Changes to Supreme Court Practice”–a review of recent changes to Supreme Court practice in the modification and removal of restrictive covenants.
The Supreme Court has again dismissed an application to vary a covenant by reason of a plaintiff’s failure to discharge its evidentiary burden under s84(1)(c) of the Property Law Act 1958.
In Del Papa v Falting & Ors, Lansdowne AsJ held:
80 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the burden is not on the defendants to establish injury; rather, it is on the plaintiff to discount it. Mr Chapman concedes that he did not inspect the rear of the Subject Land and so its interface with the only adjacent benefited land, that owned by the eleventh and twelfth defendants. Accordingly, there is no evidence that there will be no substantial direct injury to this portion of benefited land.
81 This absence of evidence in relation to direct impact on the land of the eleventh and twelfth defendants, does undermine the plaintiff’s case pursuant to s 84(1)(c). The more significant factor in its failure, is, however, that the plaintiff has failed, in my view, to show that there will be no substantially injurious precedential effect of the proposed modification.
The Court was also unimpressed with the Plaintiff’s bifurcated application:
20 Mr Del Papa’s evidence is that he and his wife would be prepared to build in accordance with schematic design plans dated February 2017 that he attaches to his affidavit. An enlarged version is Exhibit F. These plans show two options. Option A is for two very substantial two storey dwellings, one five bedroom plus rumpus room and study, and one four bedroom plus rumpus room and study. Option B is for three slightly smaller, but still very substantial, two storey dwellings, each five bedroom plus rumpus room.
131 I would also have been troubled by the fact that the proposed development is not even certain as to number of dwellings, as the plaintiff seeks either a two, or a three, lot subdivision. This is a matter that the Court can of course determine, if persuaded to grant the application, but it does raise a question as to the degree of commitment of the plaintiff to pursue her advanced proposals if the application is granted.
The take away lesson for applicants is that when you move from an uncontested application to a contested hearing, you need to make a first-principles re-assessment of the evidentiary basis of your application: revisit the plans, revisit the site and reassess the forensic basis upon which you say a precedent will not be created.
In Manderson v Wright (No 2)  VSC 162, the Supreme Court revealed the devastating potential consequences of breaching a restrictive covenant.
In this case Justice John Dixon ordered the demolition of about $1 million of building renovations at a property at Barwon Heads, saying the building works occurred outside the permitted building envelope governed by a restrictive covenant, “I am not persuaded in all of the circumstances that the hardship to the defendant from a demolition order is out of all proportion to the relief assured to the plaintiff.”
A subsequent decision on costs of the proceedings, saw the unsuccessful defendant, Ms Wright, liable for 50% of the costs of the proceeding, claimed by the plaintiff to be $460,000.
VCAT has again shown how difficult it is to modify a covenant via the Planning and Environment Act 1987 process, when a beneficiary of the covenant opposes the application.
In Stuart v Mornington Peninsula SC  VCAT 67, the permit applicant sought a permit to vary a covenant that limited the height of a boundary fence to 18 inches (0.46m) in height. The application sought to allow a fence ranging in heights between about 1.5m to 2.2m, extending for a length of ~30m.
The Council refused the application on the basis that it could not be satisfied that the proposed covenant variation met the tests required by section 60(5) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987, because an objection had been received from a beneficiary who expressed a perceived detriment.
The applicant submitted that there would be no detriment to any beneficiary in allowing the new fence and that the objection was so clearly without merit that it should be considered to be vexatious or not made with good faith within the meaning of s 60(5) of the PE Act.
The objector submitted that the variation of the covenant would be detrimental to the enjoyment of her property, the amenity of the area and contrary to the purposes of the covenant.
The Tribunal also entertained the submissions of another objector who was not a beneficiary of the covenant, consistent with DP Gibson’s ruling in Hill v Campaspe SC (Red Dot) (2011) VCAT.
The Tribunal explained that because the covenant was created or registered before 25 June 1991, s 60(5) of the Act applies. This provides:
(5) The responsible authority must not grant a permit which allows the removal or variation of a restriction referred to in subsection (4) unless it is satisfied that—
(a) the owner of any land benefited by the restriction (other than an owner who, before or after the making of the application for the permit but not more than three months before its making, has consented in writing to the grant of the permit) will be unlikely to suffer any detriment of any kind (including any perceived detriment) as a consequence of the removal or variation of the restriction; and
(b) if that owner has objected to the grant of the permit, the objection is vexatious or not made in good faith.
The decision maker is required to be satisfied of both limbs of s 60(5) before directing the grant of a permit for the variation of the covenant.
Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected the application because it did not find the beneficiaries’ objection to be vexatious or not made in good faith. This was so, even though the beneficiary would not be able to see the fence from her own property.
The take away lesson from this case is that if you are attempting to modify a covenant created before 25 June 1991 and you have a beneficiary opposing that application, it is rarely, if ever, worthwhile taking the matter on appeal to VCAT. Your remedy is more likely to be via the Property Law Act 1958 or Supreme Court process.
What is a restrictive covenant?
A restrictive covenant is a contract that runs with the land, that is negative in nature. More particularly, a restrictive covenant is an agreement creating an obligation which is negative or restrictive, forbidding the commission of some act. In its most common form it is a contract between neighbouring land owners by which the covenantee determined to maintain the value of a parcel of land or to preserve its enjoyment, acquires a right to restrain the other party, namely the covenantor, from using the land in a certain way: Fitt v Luxury Developments Pty Ltd (2000) VSC 258. The land subject to a restrictive covenant is known as the burdened land and the land with the corresponding ability to enforce the covenant is known as the benefited land.
How do I know if land is burdened by a restrictive covenant
If a restrictive covenant burdens or runs with a parcel of land, it should be noted under the heading “Encumbrances, Caveats and Notices” on a certificate of title available from Landata. You can then search Landata again for the relevant covenant that is often contained within a Transfer of Land, or ask a title searching firm to do this for you. One such title searching firm is Feigl & Newell on (03) 9620 7022.
How do I know if land has the benefit of a restrictive covenant?
Typically, the extent of beneficiaries can be discerned from a careful reading of the words of the covenant itself, but this may require further title searches and a careful examination of the Parent Title. Some covenants purport to convey the benefit of a covenant to all land in a subdivision, which may not be legally effective, see Re Mack and the Conveyancing Act  NSWLR 623. Before you become a party to proceedings concerning the modification or enforcement of a covenant, seek advice from a lawyer with experience in this area. Many people assume that because their land is located within an estate burdened by a network of similar covenants, they are necessarily a beneficiary to other comparable covenants, which may not be the case. See too, the section on Building Schemes, below.
How do I vary or modify a restrictive covenant?
There are several ways in which restrictive covenants can be varied or modified, but the two most common means are via a planning permit application to the local council or by application to the Supreme Court.
There is an initial appeal to applying for a permit to modify a covenant via the planning permit or Planning and Environment Act 1987 process, because it is seen to be cheaper and easier, but this appeal diminishes when one understands that all beneficiaries need to be notified (unless a pre-existing breach is being regularised) and for covenants created before 25 June 1991, only one genuine objection from a beneficiary is sufficient to bring the process to an abrupt halt.
For this reason, applications that might be seen as even slightly controversial, such as increasing the number of dwellings on a lot, routinely go straight to the Supreme Court. Most applications to the Supreme Court are successful as they proceed through the process without sustained objection, but the challenge here is to pitch your application at something a judge will be comfortable with, for the Courts have traditionally acted with caution when it comes to modifying restrictive covenants.
For more information about the various options for modifying or removing a restrictive covenant in Victoria see here.
How do I modify a covenant through the Supreme Court?
To modify a covenant through the Property Law Act 1958, or Supreme Court, process, an applicant will typically need a planning report prepared by a planner with experience in this area of law and an Originating Motion drafted by a solicitor. There are numerous other procedural requirements that invariably require the involvement of an experienced and competent lawyer.
Once the application is lodged with the Court, a hearing is convened at which directions for advertising is given by an Associate Judge. Typically the notification process will take eight to ten weeks before a further hearing is convened at which objections may be considered by the Court.
If no objectors appear to be heard, which is routinely the case, the Court will consider granting the relief sought, but a judge may still want to be convinced about the appropriateness of the application. If it is positively received, relief may be granted at that time. However, if the matter is contested, directions may be given for the exchange of evidence and submissions and the hearing may be listed some six months or so later for determination.
A detailed description of the process of modifying or removing a restrictive covenant in the Supreme Court is set out here along with a comprehensive collection of precedents.
How do I object to an application to vary a restrictive covenant?
An objection to vary a restrictive covenant does not need to take any particular form. However, it is useful to understand what the Court deems to be a relevant or persuasive reason to object against what is typically seen as being irrelevant or difficult to establish. A useful indication was given by Justice Cavanough in Prowse v Johnston who gave weight to objections that complained of loss of character, loss of privacy, the bulk of the proposed building, additional noise, traffic, parking and access issues and most importantly, that of precedent, that is, is this proposal the thin edge of the wedge?
An article setting out the process of objecting to a restrictive covenant in Victoria is set out here.
The Supreme Court published a guide for objectors in December 2017.
What is a building scheme?
Where a building scheme, or scheme of development is established, all purchasers and their assigns are bound by, and entitled to the benefit of, the restrictive covenant. However, notwithstanding the frequency with which they are discussed, in Victoria, they are something of a unicorn–often talked about, but never actually seen. The real difficulty in attempting to uphold a building scheme in this state is establishing that a purchaser of land was or should have been aware that a building scheme was in place prior to purchase and therefore ought to be bound by its terms. An authority that helpfully sets the relevant principles is Vrakas v Mills  VSC 463.
How to interpret a restrictive covenant
An article setting out some principles for the construction or interpretation of a restrictive covenant in Victoria is set out here.
Should I buy land subject to a restrictive covenant?
If the land is of no use to you unless the covenant is modified, it is probably unwise to buy it. The process of modifying a covenant is often too uncertain, too time consuming and too expensive to justify taking the risk. Covenants can cost as little as a few thousand dollars to modify if things go well. On the other hand, parties have spent close to half a million dollars to modify covenants without success. Equally, some modifications may be completed within weeks. Others may take years. Most applications to modify covenants receive little or no sustained opposition, others ignite well orchestrated and well resourced community campaigns. Any estimate as to prospects is just a well informed guess. If you’re not dissuaded, get a beneficiary report from Feigl and Newell and then find a lawyer with experience in the modification of restrictive covenants to give you an estimate of the likely opposition to change. You may be lucky and find there only a few beneficiaries who live some distance away.
How can I find a restrictive covenant lawyer?
The modification or removal of restrictive covenants is a specialised area of law and regularly done by only a handful of lawyers in Victoria. An article setting out a reliable means of finding a lawyer with experience in the jurisdiction is set out here.
Costs in an application to modify a restrictive covenant
An article summarising the principles in relation to orders of costs in s84/Supreme Court proceedings is set out here.
Representing yourself in an application to modify a restrictive covenant
Judges make every effort to accommodate self-represented litigants. The Supreme Court even has a self-represented litigant coordinator who may be able to provide you with some guidance.
Traditionally, the practice has been to set the matter down for a contested hearing in the normal manner, with the exchange of evidence and submissions. This can involve much time and a large amount of preparation. But more recently, the Supreme Court has facilitated self-represented litigants in covenant cases, by giving people an opportunity to present a short submission at the second return of the application, that is, immediately after advertising. In this way, litigants in person can put a short summary of their views to the judge, without becoming a party to the proceedings; without the need to prepare evidence or cross examine witnesses; and without the potential costs consequences of running a contested case to its conclusion. It must be remembered though, that this will occur in the course of a busy Court list and the judge’s capacity or preparedness to entertain detailed submissions will be limited. The Plaintiff also may elect to not press its case at this second return, and may ask the Court to set the case down on a future occasion, at which time the application can be heard and determined in a more considered manner.
Further, although there are cases in which the court has refused applications to modify covenants, even where there are no parties in opposition such as in Re: Jensen and in Re: Morihovitis, in practice, it is probably fair to say that a defendant has far lower prospects of success if they are not represented, and the plaintiff’s case is not thoroughly tested.
As mentioned above, the matters you wish to put before the Court are set out here.
Mediation and applications to modify restrictive covenants
An article explaining the role and utility of mediating covenant disputes in the Supreme Court is set out here.
How do I deal with a restrictive covenant that gives a discretion to a deregistered company?
An article setting out the process for dealing with a restrictive covenant that confers a discretion on a deregistered company is set out here.
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At the second return of an application for the modification of a restrictive covenant (usually, the first hearing after notification to beneficiaries), the judge may ask whether you wish to set the matter down for mediation.
If one or both parties agree, the judge may add the following words into the draft orders:
– The proceeding be referred to a mediator to be agreed between the parties or in default of agreement to be appointed by the Court, such mediation is to take place by [date].
– The mediation must be attended by those persons who have the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether to settle the dispute and the terms of any settlement and the lawyers who have ultimate responsibility to advise the parties in relation to the dispute and its settlement.
– Subject to the terms of this order, the solicitor for the plaintiff must, after consultation with all parties, deliver to the mediator a copy of this order and copy of any other relevant information, and take all steps necessary to ensure that the mediation commences as soon as practicable.
– The mediator not later than 3 days after conclusion of the mediation, report back to the Court as to whether the mediation is finished.
– Subject to any further order, the costs of the mediation shall be paid in the first instance by the plaintiff.
For plaintiffs, the benefit of mediating is the prospect of an almost certain outcome in litigation that they are likely to end up financing. It also perhaps comes as the unwelcome news arrives that the case is going to be contested.
For defendants, it may also mean that an acceptable outcome may be achieved, without the expense and inconvenience of having to prepare for a contested hearing.
For both parties, mediation permits creative settlement opportunities that might not be possible in an otherwise binary decision making process. For instance, in Rosenwald v Hogg, Macaulay J observed:
This is a classic example of a case where the parties may well have been able to achieve a ‘compromise’ result, by negotiation and agreement, which the court simply could not give them. That opportunity was given to the parties at the commencement of this case when I pointed out the finely balanced difference between them having regard to their respective experts’ opinions.
One example may be the articulation of building envelopes as occurred in this case.
Another example might be the drafting of a side agreement, for instance, in relation to the retention of protection of vegetation during the development process. Bear in mind, however, that side agreements may be personal and of little use if the relevant land is subsequently sold. Covenants, of course, mostly run with the land.
A mediation will usually take only half a day. They normally commence with the mediator explaining that what is said in the mediation is ‘without prejudice’–that is, it cannot be referred to in open Court. And then the parties may take a few minutes each setting out what they hope to achieve from the mediation. The mediator may then take the parties aside to ‘caucus’ or endeavour to ascertain the underlying objectives of importance to each party. Identifying these underlying issues is likely to assist in achieving an outcome that is acceptable for everyone.
The choice of the mediator is important. Someone who has experience in the jurisdiction is more likely to be able to fairly and accurately assess the likely range of outcomes at a contested hearing. Three names include:
- Bill Rimmer, +61 3 9225 7222; https://www.greenslist.com.au/barrister/William-Rimmer
- David Lloyd, +61 3 9225 6958; https://www.vicbar.com.au/profile/6947 or
- myself, Matthew Townsend, +61 3 9225 8558 https://www.listgbarristers.com.au/barristers/matthew-townsend
A mediator is not there to provide legal advice to act as a party’s advocate. That said, there may be some practical benefit in having a neutral third party explaining the process in objective terms. For unrepresented parties, and for those quite unfamiliar with the process of modifying a restrictive covenant, this may be of particular assistance.
For applicants, it is important to remember that simply because you have a mediated agreement doesn’t mean the Court will necessarily accept that agreement by modifying the covenant in the manner agreed. You may still need to convince a judge that you have established an absence of substantial injury on the totality of beneficiaries, and that there are no other reasons why the judge should exercise his or her residual discretion against the modification proposed. However, a mediated outcome, in most cases, will certainly assist in proving to the Court an absence of substantial injury and one might suggest that it’s still better to fail here, than after the expense of a contested hearing.
Restrictive covenants in Victoria often give development discretion to companies that have long been deregistered. A good example is the series of covenants affecting the area around Altona that may provide:
… nor will I or my heirs executors administrators or transferees use any material other than brick and/or stone for the main walls of any such shop or dwelling house without the consent in writing of the said Altona Beach Estates Limited
Altona Beach Estates Limited, the original developer of the land, has long ceased to exist.
A question is then raised: how will the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) exercise its discretion if it is called upon to act in the capacity of the deregistered company pursuant to section 601AE(2) of the Corporations Act 2001?
Helpfully, ASIC has produced a practice note of sorts to explain its policy in relation to such requests.
This policy states that ASIC may consider applications for consent under an encumbrance (e.g. plans of subdivision where there is no specific prohibition to subdivision in the encumbrance; construction of a fence within the restrictions/conditions of the encumbrance) and may consider applications to discharge expired encumbrances. However, ASIC will not otherwise vary the restrictions/conditions of an encumbrance or discharge a current encumbrance.
It is not then, as some might have you believe, a fait accomplis that the discretion will be exercised in the applicant’s favour.
The policy can be found here: http://asic.gov.au/for-business/closing-your-company/effects-of-deregistration/property-of-deregistered-companies/there-is-an-encumbrance-also-known-as-a-covenant-or-restrictive-covenant-over-my-property-in-favour-of-a-deregistered-company/
In Clare & Ors v Bedelis  VSC 381 AsJ Derham found that a house built using a wooden sub-frame, did not breach a building materials covenant preventing the construction of a dwelling house “other than one having walls of brick or stone.”
In doing so, the Victorian Supreme Court effectively set aside the approach that has been in place since the 1956 decision of Sholl J in Jacobs v Greig VLR 597 that has often been said to require houses subject to such building materials covenants to be double brick construction:
113 In my unaccompanied view of the Land and neighbourhood, it became apparent that the bulk of the houses were constructed with an external appearance of brick. Some had upper levels that included timber. But the overall appearance of the neighbourhood was that the houses were substantial in size and built of brick, whether that was solid brick or brick veneer could not be seen. Apart from the decision in Jacobs v Greig, there is no warrant in this case for the conclusion that the requirement, in effect, that the dwelling house on the Land be constructed with walls of brick or stone has the purpose of anything more than the aesthetic appearance of the house and the avoidance of low quality materials. As I have said, I am not prepared to take judicial notice that strength, durability or any other matter forms a part of the purpose of the Covenant. The evidence before Sholl J in Jacobs v Greig is not before me. In any event, that decision was merely an interlocutory decision arrived at on the basis that there was a prima facie case that the construction of the covenant required solid or cavity brick and not brick veneer. …
119 The evidence in this case clearly shows that the house has walls of brick, albeit brick veneer. There is nothing in the covenant that requires the roof to be supported by the brick walls as distinct from the timber frame. There is no evidence produced by the plaintiffs to establish that the meaning of the expression ‘walls of brick or stone’ in 1956 or indeed at any other time, does not embrace brick veneer walls. I am therefore not satisfied that the house under construction is in breach of the covenant because it is constructed with walls of brick veneer.
Owen Dixon Chambers
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In the decision of Clare & Ors v Bedelis  VSC 381 AsJ Derham has usefully restated the principles for construing or interpreting a covenants:
(a) subject to the qualifications mentioned below, the ordinary principles of interpretation of written documents apply. The object of interpretation is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language of the document in question;
(b) the words of a restrictive covenant:
(i) should generally be given their ordinary and everyday meaning and not be interpreted using a technical or legal approach. Evidence may be admitted, however, as to the meaning of technical engineering, building or surveying terms and abbreviations;
(ii) must always be construed in their context, upon a reading of the whole of the instrument, and having regard to the purpose or object of the restriction;
(c) importantly, the words of a restrictive covenant should be given the meaning that a reasonable reader would attribute to them. The reasonable reader may have knowledge of such of the surrounding circumstances as are available. These circumstances may be limited to the most obvious circumstances having regard to the operation of the Torrens system and the fact that the covenant is recorded in the register kept by the Registrar of Titles. As the High Court held in Westfield:
The third party who inspects the Register cannot be expected, consistently with the scheme of the Torrens system, to look further for extrinsic material which might establish facts or circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the registered dealing and placing the third party (or any court later seized of a dispute) in the situation of the grantee…
(d) the words of the covenant should be construed not in the abstract but by reference to the location and the physical characteristics of the properties which are affected by it, and having regard to the plan of subdivision and, depending on the evidence, possibly having regard to corresponding covenants affecting other lots in the estate;
(e) because the meaning of particular words depend upon their context (including the purpose or object of the restriction in a covenant) cases that consider similar words provide no more than persuasive authority as to the meaning of words in a different document. Further, the decisions upon an expression in one instrument are of very dubious utility in relation to another;
(f) the rules of evidence assisting the construction of contracts inter partes, of the nature explained by Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales, do not apply to the construction of easements and covenants;
(g) if the meaning remains in doubt after other rules of interpretation have been applied, as a last resort or ‘very late resort,’ the covenant should be construed contra proferentem, that is, against the covenantor;
(h) whether a covenant has been breached or not is a question of fact to be determined according to the facts of the case and in the light of the actual language in which the restrictive covenant is framed; and
(i) generally speaking, the proper construction of an instrument intended to have legal effect is a question of law, not fact. On the other hand, the meaning of a particular word or expression in such an instrument may be a question of fact, particularly where the Court has already determined as a matter of construction that the word or expression is used in its ordinary and natural meaning.
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Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation
 Bradbrook and Neave’s Easements and Restrictive Covenants, AJ Bradbrook and SV MacCallum, 3rd Ed, (‘Bradbrook & Neave’), [15.3].
 Bradbrook & Neave; But see Prowse v Johnston & Ors  VSC 4 at – (‘Prowse’).
 Re Marshall and Scott’s Contract  VLR 98, 99; Ferella v Otvosi (2005) 64 NSWLR 101 at 107 (‘Ferella’); Ex parte High Standard Constructions Limited (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 274 at 278 (‘High Standard’); Prowse at .
 Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council  NSWCA 64 at -(‘Phoenix’); Westfield Management Limited v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited, (2007) 233 CLR 528 at  (‘Westfield’).
 Ferella at 107; High Standard at 278; Prowse at .
 Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 at , 462 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Phoenix at -.
 Phoenix at -.
 These are limited by the decision in Westfield and subsequent decisions: see Sertari Pty Ltd v Nirimba Developments Pty Ltd  NSWCA 324; Berryman v Sonnenschein  NSWSC 213; Shelbina Pty Ltd v Richards  NSWSC 1449; Neighbourhood Association DP No 285220 v Moffat  NSWSC 54; Fermora Pty Ltd v Kelvedon Pty Ltd  WASC 281 at -; Prowse at .
 Westfield at -; Sertari at ; Phoenix at -.
 Westfield at .
 Richard van Brugge v Hare  NSWSC 1364 at ; Big River Paradise Ltd v Congreve  NZCA 78 at .
 Sertari Pty Ltd v Nirimba Developments Pty Ltd  NSWCA 324 at ; See Fermora Pty Ltd v Kelvedon Pty Ltd  WASC 281 at ; Prowse at .
 Bradbrook & Neave at [15.4] citing Christie & Purdon v Dalco Holdings Pty Ltd  Tas SR 34 at 41.
 Ferella at ; In Re Marshall and Scott’s Contract  VLR 98, at 100 where Mann CJ observed that small differences of language can be of great importance and that the decision often turns on them; Prowse at .
 (1982) 149 CLR 337.
 Westfield; Ryan v Sutherland  NSWSC 1397 at ; Prowse at .
 Ferella at ; Bradbrook & Neave’s at [15.6].
 Per Herring CJ in In Re Bishop and Lynch’s Contract  VLR 179 at 181; Prowse at .
 See, in relation to statutes, S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal  1 VR 83 at 88 (J D Phillips JA). See, in relation to written contracts, FAI Insurance Co Ltd v Savoy Pty Ltd  2 VR 343 at 351 (Brooking J); O’Neill v Vero Insurance Ltd  VSC 364  (Beach J); Prowse at .
 See S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal  1 VR 83 at 88; cf Phoenix at ; Prowse at .
In Gardencity Altona v Grech  VSC 538 Associate Justice Lansdowne refused an application to remove a covenant requiring the main walls of any dwelling or shop on the land to be of brick and/or stone, on the basis that it could not be said that the covenant was obsolete, or that it’s removal would not occasion substantial injury to those with the benefit of the covenant.
No single dwelling covenant attached to the land, and so arguably, only the building materials covenant prevented the applicant from realising his development plans for the land.
Instrumental to her Honour’s reasoning was that the defendants had a genuine preference for the use of brick as a building material.
Her Honour also left open the possibility that if it were shown that removal of the brick or stone restriction would make a taller building less likely that may be a further benefit conferred by the restriction and so further reason why the restriction is not obsolete.
Significantly, the application was made in a neighbourhood found to be predominantly constructed with brick or stone:
142 I find on the whole of the evidence that the buildings in the neighbourhood predominantly have their main walls constructed in brick or stone. As indicated, I refer in this finding to the actual incidence of the use of brick or stone, rendered or exposed, not the visual incidence of exposed brick. By ‘predominantly’ I mean well more than half, and on a broad estimate at least two thirds.
This feature of the case will require close scrutiny for parties wishing to rely on the decision as a precedent.
Of particular interest is that the Court declined to apply the 1956 decision of Jacobs v Greig  VLR 597, often cited as authority for the proposition that a requirement to build out of brick requires ‘double brick’ construction rather than brick veneer:
134 Having regard to Mr McLaughlin’s expert evidence that brick veneer is now an acceptable use of brick in construction, I consider the particular outcome in Jacobs v Greig to be limited to its particular facts and time. On the principle identified in that case, I find that an ordinary resident of Victoria would consider the covenants here in question do not now exclude brick veneer. Accordingly, I find that for this case at least, brick veneer is ‘brick’ for the purposes of the covenants, and like covenants in the area.
This is a welcome development given that double brick is now rarely used in Victoria for reasons of cost and energy efficiency.
Owen Dixon Chambers
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